The Power Structure of Asian Cricket: A Game Caught Between Boards, Markets and Geopolitics

Asia is the economic centre of world cricket, yet its governance has never kept pace with that gravity. Under the ICC's 2026-27 revenue cycle, the Board of Control for Cricket in India receives roughly 38 per cent of the distribution — several times more than any other full member. Asia also hosts the largest television audience base and the richest domestic T20 leagues. But alongside that financial dominance sits a second reality: the Asian Cricket Council has neither the constitutional authority of the ICC, nor an independent dispute-resolution mechanism, nor a genuine peer-level forum for its member boards. The imbalance did not appear overnight. It is the combined product of three separate processes: the ICC's voting and revenue architecture, bilateral politics within Asia, and a global calendar reshaped by the rise of T20 leagues. Viewed separately they look like distinct stories; in practice they are threads of the same fabric. The ICC's governance framework formally grants every full member equal standing. In practice, decision-making power tracks financial weight. The 'Big Three' model adopted in 2026 — giving India, Australia and England financial and administrative privileges — was formally rolled back in 2026, but the logic behind it still operates. Revenue is still distributed on the basis of market contribution, and India's contribution is the largest. The boards that earn the most also decide the most, and the cycle reinforces itself. For smaller Asian members this means their voice is heard only when it aligns with a larger board's agenda. Nepal, Oman, the UAE and Hong Kong have no independent bargaining power over their place in the international calendar. They depend largely on bilateral series and qualifying tournaments scheduled by bigger boards or by the ICC. The BCCI's market weight is not visible only in revenue figures. It shows in the fact that broadcast and sponsorship income multiplies for any team touring India, which is why nearly every full member places a series against India at the top of its calendar. India's scheduling priorities effectively become world cricket's priorities: when India chooses to play a tournament, it is commercially viable; when it does not, questions arise about its viability. That power is inherently contentious, because it is sometimes exercised for political ends. In Asian cricket, the state of bilateral relations is directly reflected in the calendar. India and Pakistan have not played a bilateral series for years, meeting now mainly in multilateral events. This is not merely an administrative matter; it is tied directly to the political relationship between the two countries. The Asia Cup is the clearest illustration. The 2026 edition was to be hosted by Pakistan, but India refused to travel. The solution was a hybrid model under which some matches were played in Pakistan and India's matches in Sri Lanka. The 2026 edition was held in the UAE, where the India-Pakistan fixture was again the focal point. The hybrid model was originally a temporary accommodation, but it has now become a permanent feature of Asian cricket administration. A less-discussed aspect is the effect on host nations' sovereignty and economic interests. When matches are relocated to neutral venues, the host board loses expected revenue and gate income — especially difficult for financially weaker boards for whom hosting a major tournament is a rare opportunity. This is where the ACC's structural weakness becomes visible. The council has no independent mechanism to resolve political disputes among members. Its presidency rotates, but real decision-making power often remains concentrated with the most influential member. The council has no permanent secretariat, no independent dispute-resolution chamber and no standardised revenue-sharing policy. As a result, the ACC functions in most matters as a coordinating body rather than a regulator. The second major force in Asian cricket is the rise of T20 leagues. After the Indian Premier League came the Pakistan Super League, the Lanka Premier League, the Bangladesh Premier League and ILT20, with domestic leagues also launching in countries such as Nepal. These leagues have become a major new source of player income, but they have also challenged the traditional structure of international cricket. The most direct effect has been on the international calendar. Players now appear in several leagues across the year, and the time available to national teams keeps shrinking. In some cases players prioritise league cricket over bilateral series because the income is higher and the injury risk is perceived as lower. Smaller boards find it harder to field their strongest teams. The burden on players has grown too. The workload of cricketers such as Virat Kohli, Rohit Sharma, Babar Azam, Rashid Khan and Shakib Al Hasan has risen sharply over the past decade. Several have taken breaks from formats to manage workload, which has become a routine administrative challenge. Broadcast rights are the financial foundation of this entire structure. The biggest broadcast deals in Asian cricket are tied to the Indian market, which is why tournament timings and venues are often set to suit Indian audiences. That is commercially rational, but it also means the convenience of local audiences in host countries comes second. Afghanistan is the most complex example of the entanglement of politics and sport in Asian cricket. Even after the Taliban's return to power in 2026, the national team continued to compete internationally, and players such as Rashid Khan remained active in global leagues. But some countries restricted bilateral ties with Afghanistan: Australia cancelled bilateral series in protest at restrictions imposed on women. This created a situation in which Afghan players continued to prove their ability on the field while political and moral pressure on their country persisted. The ICC has no clear, consistent policy for handling such cases, and that uncertainty continues to hang over Afghan cricket's future. Women's cricket is growing fast in Asia, but inequality remains deep. The launch of the Women's Premier League in India created a new professional platform, and players such as Smriti Mandhana and Harmanpreet Kaur are recognised globally. Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh have also begun allocating more resources to the women's game. But the growth is uneven. In several Asian countries women players get fewer matches, lower match fees and less media coverage than their male counterparts. Players such as Bangladesh's Nigar Sultana have proved their ability domestically and internationally, yet structural support remains limited. Investing in women's cricket is not only a matter of social justice; it also broadens the sport's market. The position of smaller Asian members is the weakest in this structure. Countries such as Nepal, Oman, the UAE and Hong Kong have neither large domestic markets nor long broadcast contracts. Their main income comes from ICC financial support and qualifying tournaments. Cricket's popularity has grown rapidly in Nepal and audiences are healthy, but a lack of infrastructure and financial resources prevents it from realising its potential. The biggest challenge for these countries is that they cannot set their own place in the international calendar. They get the opportunities larger boards give them, which slows talent development and reduces the incentive for long-term investment. All of this affects the player experience. Veterans such as Angelo Mathews have watched the growing pressure of the calendar across a long career, while players such as Sandeep Lamichhane have forged a path from smaller cricket nations to global leagues. Talent is not confined to one country's borders, but opportunity still is. There are possibilities for reform, but they require political will. A first step would be to give the ACC an independent dispute-resolution mechanism and a clear revenue-sharing policy. Second, guaranteed slots for smaller members in the international calendar should be ensured so their participation is not limited to qualifiers. Third, dedicated financial and structural support should be provided for women's cricket. Fourth, a clear workload-management policy should be prepared to balance leagues and international cricket. None of these steps is easy, but without them Asia's current inequality will only deepen. The greatest irony of Asian cricket is that its economic centre and its governance centre are not in the same place. Money is concentrated with a few boards, while formal participation in decision-making is distributed among all. As long as that gap persists, tension will persist in Asian cricket politics — and however much the game on the field changes, the structure behind it will remain the same.